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AUSTRALIA’S 2009 DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
A Maritime Focus for Uncertain Times
Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman
As a significant medium power in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia inescap-ably is a participant in the most politically, economically, and strategically
dynamic part of the world. The region is a vast and politically complex area, one
that is increasingly prosperous, confident, volatile, and potentially dangerous in
almost equal parts. Situated at the nexus of the Pacific and Indian oceans, Aus-
tralia must share in both the opportunities and challenges thrown up by these
two great maritime stages for geopolitical interaction.
As a maritime trading state highly dependent upon secure sea lines of com-
munication stretching from the Middle East to North America, Australia is tied
comprehensively and profitably to Asia’s economic success. Yet Australia must
also suffer the less positive implications of such dynamism, including growing
strategic competition among the region’s major pow-
ers, an increasing competition for resources, active
Islamist terrorist threats, unpredictable and unsatis-
fied states in combination with the related danger of
weapons of mass destruction and missile prolifera-
tion, and the consequences of failing or troubled
states unable to cope with political, economic, envi-
ronmental, or demographic stresses.
The impact of such factors has been especially evi-
dent for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which
over the past decade has been operating at a constantly
high tempo in response to strategic crises, disintegrat-
ing societies, or grave natural disasters—from East
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Timor to the Persian Gulf and the Solomon Islands, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sumatra,
and Pakistan. Indeed, there have been many other, lesser ADF deployments over
that time as well, along with the added importance of border security in the
post-9/11 world.
THE 2009 WHITE PAPER IN BRIEF
Yet Australia’s official defense policy and long-term planning to shape the ADF
for the looming challenges in the decades ahead had, until this year, not changed
for nine years. This situation was rectified in May 2009 with the release of a new
defense white paper, after a prolonged gestation period. It is a significant docu-
ment, with important implications for Australia’s status as a regional medium
power, its ability to respond to future threats and project influence in a funda-
mentally maritime region, and its future utility as a leading ally to the ultimate
arbiter of regional order, the United States.
National Security and Defense Policy
Elected in November 2007 the Labor government, under Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd, issued its defense white paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Cen-
tury: Force 2030, to take account of the evolution in strategic circumstances and
to differentiate its defense policy from that of the previous Liberal-National Co-
alition government. The paper was drafted by a team led by Mike Pezzullo, sec-
onded from his position as Deputy Secretary Strategy in the Department of
Defence. The writing process appears to have been more robust and inclusive
than in previous such documents, with a notable use of war gaming, involve-
ment of the individual services, and regular government oversight.1
At the outset the white paper acknowledges the complexity of global affairs
today and the consequent need to balance the demands on the ADF. These are
generated by the need to be able to respond to interstate and intrastate conflict
and the need to contribute to support operations against nonstate global forces.
Essentially, the relatively small Australian Defence Force needs to be able to con-
tribute significantly, even decisively, in operations ranging from humanitarian
assistance to major interstate conflict.2
Thus the 2009 white paper aims for a balance between resources available
for defense and desired strategic weight and reach.3 It highlights Australia’s re-
liance on a continued U.S. willingness and capacity to provide stability in the
Asia-Pacific and categorizes strategic risk as needing either a nondiscretionary
response from Australia or allowing a more selective approach.4 Furthermore,
the white paper establishes a strategic risk–based approach to defense plan-
ning, founded on the five-yearly production of white papers—each preceded
by formal risk assessments and force structure reviews.5
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The white paper’s strategic outlook reflects Australia’s continuing interest in
seeing the United States retain global primacy but also notes the rise of both
China and India as potential great powers, with particular emphasis on China’s
potential to challenge the United States economically.6 It further identifies the
potential for violence or political instability in a range of countries from the
Middle East to Northeast Asia and the probability that the United States will
need greater support from allies and potential partners like Australia. Finally,
there is recognition of “new security risks,” including climate change (with its
potential for major problems in the South Pacific) and the supply of energy,
food, and water.
Notwithstanding the broad geographical reach of the outlook, the white pa-
per geographically bounds Australia’s main strategic interests: the defense of
Australia and security in the immediate neighborhood—that is, Indonesia, East
Timor, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and the South Pacific. This is based on
the premise that Australia’s capacity to influence events is greatest closer to
home.7 The white paper does, however, confirm that Australia will deploy far-
ther afield and continue to support U.S. efforts—but not unconditionally—in
maintaining a rules-based global order.8 It reiterates the long-standing principle
of defense self-reliance: Australia expects to meet most direct military threats
without combat support from America but notes the significant advantage that
accrues from access to U.S. intelligence and technology.9
Future Force Structure
Development of the white paper incorporated a force structure review, from
which has emerged “Force 2030”—a future ADF optimized to deter and defeat
attacks against Australia but capable of contributing to domestic security and
emergency response as well as to regional stability and security.10 Force 2030 is
expected to be more potent than the existing ADF, especially in all aspects of
maritime warfare, air superiority, strike, and information operations. The
planned improvements in maritime warfare capabilities are particularly signifi-
cant. The intent is for the ADF to maintain a strategic capability edge in the re-
gion, by continuing to exploit and apply advanced technologies.11
The ADF is expected to maintain a level of preparedness that will allow the
government to respond to a broad range of contingencies. Among the specific
government demands are the ability to establish and maintain sea control and
air superiority in key places in the primary operational environment near region
and the ability to project maritime and airpower beyond that if necessary.12 Sig-
nificantly, there is a stated need to be able to deploy and sustain a brigade group
and, possibly simultaneously, an additional battalion group in a different loca-
tion—both potentially for prolonged periods.13
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Complicating Issues
Concluding the white paper is a brief exposition of the financial plan underpin-
ning the force structure and other initiatives. There is no cost assessment for any
individual initiative, simply commitments to funding levels to the year 2030: 3
percent real growth in the defense budget to 2017/18, 2.2 percent real growth
from 2018/19 to 2030, and 2.5 percent fixed indexation to the defense budget
from 2009/10 to 2030.14 The government has also stated that the planned force
structure depends on the success of the A$20 billion Defence Strategic Reform
Program, which is intended to generate internal savings for reinvestment in ca-
pability over the next ten years. Emphasizing the importance of the Strategic Re-
form Program, the funding statement also points out that any funding shortfalls
in the white paper plan will be found from within Defence.15
While the white paper promises much for the planned force, recent history is
sobering. For example, the 1987 white paper indicated that the surface combat-
ant force would be expanded to sixteen or seventeen ships.16 It remains at twelve.
The 1987 white paper also acknowledged the need to allocate 2.6 to 2.9 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) to support the proposed program.17 From that
point, defense spending as a proportion of GDP began a gradual decline until it
reached a low of 1.9 percent just a few years ago. In all likelihood, a different gov-
ernment will enact or otherwise amend this program, in economic and strategic
circumstances that no one can predict today.
Attention will also focus on the personnel demands of the future force struc-
ture. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is still critically short of some categories
of officers and sailors, with particular problems in the submarine arm and with
technical personnel overall. The Navy can crew at best only three of the current
six Collins-class submarines. There is a plan to recover the submarine arm per-
sonnel situation;18 general recruiting and retention figures are showing some
promise. The RAN should be able to generate the necessary personnel numbers
over the next fifteen years or more. Nevertheless, a nationwide skills shortage
that was experienced before the onset of the global economic crisis may again
put pressure on personnel numbers when the anticipated economic recovery
appears.
STRATEGIC DRIVERS
The strategic thinking informing the 2009 white paper is perhaps the most con-
troversial element of the document. In particular, the role of China has domi-
nated not only the public debates leading to the white paper’s formulation and
release but also reportedly the internal debate within Australia’s national secu-
rity establishment.19 Indeed the influence of China upon Australia’s threat per-
ceptions has been a difficult issue for Canberra’s policy makers for over a decade,
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as the potentially destabilizing growth of Chinese material strength and its polit-
ical assertiveness throughout Australia’s wider region have been balanced by an
increasingly entangling economic embrace, one that matches Australian re-
sources to China’s insatiable demand and deep pockets. Chinese resource hun-
ger, especially for Australian iron ore, played a major role in feeding Australia’s
economic boom until the onset of the global economic crisis, and continuing
Chinese demand may yet prove sufficient to cushion the Australian economy
from the worst of the global recession. These economic ties have driven a strong
pro-China business lobby and bolstered bipartisan political support for deepen-
ing ties at all levels of engagement, including the political and strategic.
In the realm of public defense policy, the potential threat to Australia and
Australian interests from an authoritarian, strategically ambitious, and
geopolitically unsatisfied China has largely been downplayed, even rejected, as a
matter of underlying principle for the last decade. A perception that Australia
might attempt to balance its international relationships by drawing closer to
China was exacerbated by the election in November 2007 of a new government
led by the Mandarin-speaking, self-professed Sinophile former diplomat Kevin
Rudd. However, Rudd has increasingly demonstrated himself to be rather more
realistic and circumspect about China and a stronger supporter of the global
role of American power and of the centrality of the U.S. alliance for Australian
security than initially appeared to be the case.20
Indeed, in statements made in the months leading up to the final drafting of the
white paper he seemed to be establishing the case for a revision of Australia’s
stated defense policy. At the heart of his concerns were the risks to regional stabil-
ity caused by the economic and strategic dynamism of the region’s major powers.
In particular, he noted in a landmark speech in September 2008 to the Returned
Services League National Congress in Townsville, northern Queensland, that the
rise of China is “driving much of the change in our region.”21
Prime Minister Rudd further declared that the ADF will need to develop in re-
sponse to changes in the regional security environment that include the rapid mod-
ernization of military capabilities, especially “significant improvements in air
combat capability, and naval forces—including greater numbers and more ad-
vanced submarines.”22 The modernization of regional maritime capabilities in turn
presents “challenges in terms of Australia’s ability long term to defend its own sea
lines of communication.”23 Although several states in the Asia-Pacific are develop-
ing such capabilities, including India, South Korea, and Singapore, it seems clear
that in the context of the speech, both in the singling out of China and its reiteration
of Australia’s commitment to the Australia/New Zealand/United States alliance as
the first-named of “three pillars” of Australia’s strategic policy, China represented
the prime strategic concern.24
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The general China theme in driving the risk assessments for the white paper
was continued by Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Chief of the Defence Force,
who publicly raised concerns over China’s January 2008 antisatellite missile test
and Beijing’s alleged reticence to explain the rationale underpinning aspects of
its strategic modernization.25 This concern with China’s military transparency,
commonly raised by many states, should be viewed in euphemistic rather than
literal terms: it is the capabilities being developed and the strategic objectives
driving their development—many of which are in fact quite evident—that
worry China’s neighbors and its strategic rivals.
Further, two other factors contribute to the elevation of China’s position in
Australia’s threat perceptions. The first comprises China’s increased espionage
activities and cyber-warfare attacks against the Australian government, alleg-
edly including electronic spying against Prime Minister Rudd himself, in addi-
tion to targeting over the past several years expatriate Chinese within
Australia, Australian businesses, and sources of both commercial and strategic
technologies. This has led to heightened counterespionage activities by both
the Australian Security Intelligence Organization and the Defence Signals Di-
rectorate.26 Cyber attacks are acknowledged in the white paper to be more sub-
stantive and serious than previously assumed, with significant resources now
allocated to cyber-warfare needs, including the establishment of a Cyber Secu-
rity Operations Centre.27 Although there are multiple sources of cyber attacks,
it is well understood that the primary threat currently is posed by China.
Second, the white paper reiterates a long-standing policy that no major
power “that could challenge our control of the air and sea approaches to Austra-
lia” should be able to access bases in the immediate neighborhood “from which
to project force against us.”28 Realistically, there is only one major power that po-
tentially could pose such a problem. China already has military outposts deep in
the South China Sea and allegedly maintains listening posts and has designs on
basing privileges elsewhere in Southeast Asia and throughout the Indian Ocean
region. Nevertheless, the prospect of China establishing actual bases anywhere
in Southeast Asia, let alone in the immediate neighborhood, must remain only
the slimmest of possibilities. However, Chinese political and economic influ-
ence itself is increasingly problematic, particularly in the South Pacific and Pa-
pua New Guinea, where Chinese money, directed toward gaining access to
resources and countering Taiwan’s diplomatic presence, has fostered corrup-
tion, instability, and wider challenges to good governance.
In nominal terms at least, the white paper is understandably diplomatic when
it comes to the China factor. However, China is the only regional power to re-
ceive extended treatment in the document. The white paper continues the
theme set by Rudd’s Townsville speech, noting China’s rapidly growing power
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and its central role in the future stability of the region. It projects that China will
become the “strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin,” but
notes that the “pace, scope and structure” of Chinese strategic developments, in-
cluding expanding power projection capabilities, may “give its neighbors cause
for concern.”29
In some parts of the Australian defense establishment, the attitude toward
China is believed to be even more hawkish, with a draft internal Australian
Army document reportedly identifying Chinese, and potentially also Indian,
military ambitions as destabilizing and a challenge to the dominant U.S. role
throughout the Asia-Pacific: “Of particular concern is an increased likelihood
for dispute escalation as a result of changes to the perceived balance of power
with the real potential for a return to major combat operations involving
states.”30
This prospect is consistent with the white paper’s acknowledgment that
“shows of force by rising powers” over both political disputes and resources are
increasingly likely and that interstate war, including between the major powers,
cannot be ruled out in the future. As a direct result of such pessimistic, yet un-
derstandable, judgments, the white paper’s assessment of the contribution of
Defence to Australia’s national security concludes that “the main role of the ADF
should continue to be an ability to engage in conventional combat against other
armed forces.”31
In fact, taken in context, other leading regional states are treated in stark con-
trast to China. For example, Japan’s continued role as the leading regional alli-
ance partner to the United States is viewed as a fundamental aspect of regional
stability. The white paper further describes Japan as a “critical strategic partner”
and notes the deepening practical defense relationship between the ADF and the
Japan Self-Defense Forces, underpinned by the 2008 Memorandum on Defence
Cooperation.32 The white paper likewise acknowledges Australia’s shared demo-
cratic values with India and the two nations’ common security interests and
growing practical defense cooperation, especially in maritime security.33 This
latter point also reflects the emphasis given by the prime minister in 2008 to the
importance of Australia’s sea-lanes and the need for enhanced naval power to
protect those maritime interests.
Indeed, the white paper rather belatedly elevates the importance of the In-
dian Ocean in Australia’s strategic thinking, noting its growing importance as
a trade route, especially for energy supplies. Defending Australia in the Asia Pa-
cific Century recognizes the consequent growth in strategic competition
among major naval powers and states clearly that “the Indian Ocean will join
the Pacific Ocean in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and de-
fence planning”;34 strategy and planning, in turn, will have to “contemplate
M C C A F F R I E & R A H M A N 6 7
7
McCaffrie and Rahman: Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
operational concepts for operating in the Indian Ocean region, including with
regional partners with whom we share similar strategic interests.”35
Canberra’s usual statement on the continued importance of Indonesia’s in-
ternal stability to Australian security is repeated, but unlike in the 2000 white pa-
per, which was promulgated in the diplomatically fractious wake of the
Australian-led intervention in East Timor, the new document is able to strike a
more positive note on Indonesia’s internal political development.36 Conse-
quently, the document reflects the strengthening of bilateral political and secu-
rity ties exemplified by the Lombok Treaty on Security Cooperation and the
January 2009 Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation.37
If Indonesia’s democratic development has been a positive factor in Austra-
lia’s security environment, instability elsewhere in the near neighborhood con-
tinues to create headaches for Canberra policy makers. In particular, ongoing
problems in East Timor, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea will
require continuing attention.38 The white paper also reiterates Australia’s com-
mitment to assist in stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan.39
Islamist terrorism, including possible terrorist attacks involving weapons of
mass destruction, is still viewed as a significant threat, although the white paper
is more sanguine regarding the threat within Southeast Asia than in earlier secu-
rity policy documents—post-9/11 and soon after the October 2002 terrorist
bombing on Bali—suggesting that while the threat will remain extant, the
spread of regional extremist networks will be constrained by ongoing
counterterrorism efforts.40 Lastly, the white paper notes—rather too briefly,
given the issue’s domestic prominence in recent years—the ADF’s role in border
protection and support for domestic security and its unique capabilities for re-
sponding to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions throughout
the region.41
A BALANCED MARITIME FORCE
Taking into account the strategic drivers, regional geography, and Prime Minis-
ter Rudd’s stated emphasis in 2008 on naval power, it should come as no surprise
that by far the most significant force-structure initiatives in the white paper re-
late to maritime capability. Nevertheless, land and air forces do receive due at-
tention. No major size or structural changes will be made to the Army, but it will
receive new troop-lift helicopters, artillery, and deployable protected vehicles;42
it will receive as well “enhanced communications, networking and battle man-
agement systems.”43 Combined with the previously announced Abrams main
battle tanks, C-17 airlifters, and big-deck amphibious ships (LHDs), these
force-structure improvements will enable the ADF to deploy and sustain a sub-
stantial combat force in the future.
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Air combat capability will be updated with the announced purchase of up to a
hundred F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft in the next decade. While the Air
Force’s long-range strike capacity will be reduced with the 2010 withdrawal
from service of the F-111, the capability gap will be filled to an extent by the pre-
viously approved purchase of twenty-four F/A-18F aircraft, twelve of which will
be wired for conversion to EA-18G electronic attack configuration, should that
be required at a later date.44 Airlift capacity is to be further increased with an ad-
ditional two C-130J and up to ten light tactical transport aircraft.
Almost certainly the most far-reaching force-structure decision is the com-
mitment to long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), all of which will
be sea based: on the already approved, Aegis-equipped air warfare destroyers,
the new (Anzac-class replacement) frigates, and the next generation of subma-
rines.45 This represents a dramatic shift and will give the naval surface force,
and the ADF jointly, an offensive role and capacity beyond anything previously
imagined. It will also add more flexibility to the submarine’s existing roles and
will provide a range of strike options to any operational commander.
Although the introduction of LACMs may draw some criticism for introduc-
ing a new capability into the region (assuming that the missiles will be of up to
2,500-kilometer range, and thus presumably the Tomahawk), it is merely a dif-
ferent way of achieving the capability that will be lost with the retirement of the
F-111 strike aircraft.46 It is also consistent with the strategy enunciated in the
2000 white paper that “we would . . . seek to attack hostile forces as far from our
shores as possible, including in their home bases, forward operating bases and in
transit.”47 Unlike that document and its intellectual predecessor of 1987, how-
ever, the 2009 document actually provides for the force structure to accomplish
those missions.
The decision to double the submarine force to at least twelve boats is almost
as significant.48 The new submarines will be conventionally powered and locally
built, and they will have greater range and capability than the Collins class. They
will, therefore, almost certainly be the largest conventionally powered subma-
rines in service and will be a fresh design. The technical and personnel problems
that have dogged the Collins class from introduction into service will ensure that
the new submarine project receives unprecedented scrutiny during develop-
ment. The close U.S.-Australian collaboration in undersea warfare is expected to
be central to the development and sustainability of the new capability.
The new submarine force, which will begin to enter service late in the 2020s,
will be capable of land attack, antisubmarine and antishipping warfare, support
of special forces, and operations with unmanned underwater vehicles.49 The
white paper notes that for the new submarine, “long transits and potentially
short-notice contingencies in our primary operational environment demand
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high levels of mobility and endurance.” Those are demands ideally suited to a
nuclear-powered submarine, which the government expressly rules out.50 The
limited submerged speed of conventionally powered submarines does restrict
their mobility and capacity to respond to short-notice demands. Nevertheless,
the force of new submarines will be a substantial deterrent and sea-denial asset
for Australia.
One of the white paper’s real surprises is the prominence given to naval sur-
face combatants. Many defense commentators in Australia, especially those who
favor a continental strategy of sea and air denial, have long criticized surface
combatants for their supposed limited utility and vulnerability in high-threat
environments, albeit without providing realistic alternative capabilities or evi-
dence to support their claims.51 The three Aegis destroyers, based on a Spanish-
designed hull, will be joined by eight frigates (which will be larger than the
Anzac class that they will replace) and by about twenty offshore combatant ves-
sels, which in time will replace the current mix of patrol boats and hydrographic
and mine warfare vessels.52
In addition to their land-attack role, the air warfare destroyers will be armed
with the SM-6 long-range surface-to-air missile and with the U.S. Cooperative
Engagement Capability (CEC), which, if fitted to the soon-to-be-fielded
Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft, will provide an over-land
defensive capability against cruise missiles, as well as a very long-range (two
hundred nautical miles or more) air defense capacity.53 This combination will
also produce the kind of sensor grid necessary to maximize the range of the
SM-6.54
The force of eight large frigates will be optimized for antisubmarine warfare.
The first Anzac frigate entered service in 1996; the first of these new ships could
appear as early as 2021. Although the white paper is not specific as to their size,
they could share a common hull with the destroyers. This would make sense in
several respects, not least the flexibility that that hull volume would provide for
sensor and weapon fits.
The next-generation frigate’s antisubmarine warfare fit is to comprise an in-
tegrated sonar suite, incorporating a long-range active towed array, and a com-
bination of helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).55 Provision has
been made in the white paper, “as a matter of urgency,” for twenty-four new heli-
copters that will be antisubmarine and antisurface capable. Their design will al-
most certainly be based on either the U.S. MH-60R or the European NH-90.
The Air Force operates Australia’s maritime patrol aircraft, currently two
squadrons of AP-3C aircraft. These are to be replaced by a mixed force of eight
new maritime patrol aircraft and up to seven high-altitude and long-endurance
UAVs. Given that the UAVs will be able to contribute little to antisubmarine
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warfare, the number of dedicated maritime patrol aircraft may not be consistent
with the white paper’s emphasis on undersea warfare.
A force of about twenty offshore combatant vessels—corvettes of up to two
thousand tonnes—will complete the major maritime force initiatives.56 The in-
tent is to develop a single multirole hull that will incorporate modular
(containerized and portable) combat suites suitable for constabulary, mine-
warfare, and hydrographic roles.57 Most of these corvettes will be employed in
the peacetime constabulary role, but unlike any of their recent predecessors,
they will be large enough and well enough equipped to undertake war-fighting
tasks.
The maritime force structure will be rounded out with the acquisition of a re-
placement replenishment ship, a medium-size sealift ship, and six new and more
capable heavy landing craft. Together with the already contracted LHDs and the
other initiatives listed in the white paper, they point toward the RAN’s being a
well-balanced but vastly more capable and flexible regional naval force in the
future.
Implications for Australia’s Strategic Doctrine
The implications of defense policy, as articulated in the white paper, upon what
may best be described as Australia’s strategic doctrine—a subject of considerable
debate over the past quarter century—are less avoided than politically fudged in
Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century. That debate, although seemingly
interminable, has been central to the shape, capabilities, and strategic posture of
the ADF since the Dibb Report of 1986 and subsequent 1987 white paper, which
emphasized the “Defence of Australia” focus for ADF force structure.58
Briefly, the “Defence of Australia” doctrine adopted a minimalist approach to
defense strategy, with an emphasis on denial capabilities in the so-called sea-air
gap to the immediate north to prevent any physical attack against the continent
itself. This continentalist doctrine led to the development of a highly unbal-
anced and inflexible force structure. In fact, the inadequacies of the force of that
era were quite debilitating to the strategic options available to the Australian
government. It was dominated by the limited denial capabilities of the F-111
strike aircraft and submarine forces, supported by F/A-18 fighters; by a surface
fleet that lacked area-defense capabilities and combat power; and by an army
that was too small, too light, and almost undeployable in strength outside of
Australia. The limitations of this force were demonstrated by the difficulties ex-
perienced in deploying even a relatively small peacekeeping force to neighbor-
ing East Timor in 1999.
Despite the reiteration of the continentalist doctrine in the 2000 white paper,
the actual direction of defense policy, strategy, and eventually also force
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structure changed quite significantly in practical terms, perhaps as the result of
post-9/11 and IRAQI FREEDOM contingencies rather than genuine strategic in-
sight.59 The result, however, was a commitment to a more powerful and deploy-
able force, including a larger army with greater protection and firepower, three
new destroyers to assert sea control and provide air defense for deployed sea and
land forces, enhanced combat capabilities for both classes of frigates, and four
C-17 airlifters, and two large LHDs with new MRH-90 helicopters for mobility.
The 2009 white paper, perhaps in homage to the lore of the previous Labor
government and its “Defence of Australia” doctrine, treats the continental-
versus-expeditionary approaches as “a false distinction,” in part by misrepre-
senting the latter strategy.60 “Defence of Australia” always was something of a
conceit, in that the alternative model of a balanced, mobile, more “maritime”
joint force in fact would have been both more capable generally and better able
to defend Australia and its interests than the denial model. Nevertheless, de-
spite rhetoric to the contrary, the new government in the 2009 white paper
very much takes an evolutionary approach to force-structure development, ac-
cepting all the more “expeditionary” force additions made by its predecessor
and further enhancing the overall combat power, reach, and deployability of
the ADF.
Regional Reactions
Officials in several countries were briefed on the contents of the white paper
prior to its release, and the reaction seems to have been muted, except in China.
There the official response has been limited and “subdued”;61 however, media
reports suggest that initial Chinese reactions were “incandescent,” implying an
inability to see the need for the proposed ADF plans.62 Other reports suggest
confusion at the apparent Australian hawkishness in relation to China.63 Some
Chinese academics were strident in their criticism of the white paper, but one,
Rear Admiral Yang Yi of China’s National Defense University, may well have en-
capsulated the Chinese position best in claiming that China was less concerned
by the scale of the “force build-up” than by the China-threat argument that un-
derpinned it.64
By contrast, the initial official Indonesian reaction was very positive. An In-
donesian Defence Ministry spokesman, Brigadier General Slamet Heriyanto,
saw the force-structure plans as perfectly normal for an economically successful
nation.65
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ALLIANCE
While the plans detailed in the white paper may have been influenced by rising
powers in the Asia-Pacific, they have significant implications for the United
7 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss1/5
States, on whose strategic primacy Australia’s strategic outlook and defense
planning have depended since the Second World War.66 Increasingly since the
end of the Cold War, Washington has sought to deepen its relationships and
share its international security burdens with partners like Australia. Over the
last decade especially, Australian maritime forces have operated within U.S.-led
coalitions during operations in and around the Persian Gulf, contributing pri-
marily surface combatants, amphibious ships, and maritime patrol aircraft. Nu-
merically, the contributions have been small, and the combatants in particular
have had limited capability—both the Anzac and Adelaide classes, the latter of
the U.S. Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7) design. Substantial ground force deploy-
ments have also contributed to these coalitions, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
A possible challenge for the alliance lies in the discrepancy between the areas
identified as the ADF’s primary operational environment and those volatile
parts of the world—such as Northeast or Southwest Asia—where the outbreak
of conflict might require an American intervention, thus potentially also gener-
ating requests for Australian assistance as a close alliance partner. However,
while the geographical areas for future potential ADF operations may be fo-
cused upon Australia’s near neighborhood, this is likely to be a discrepancy on
paper rather than in practice.
Recent, ongoing, and future (Force 2030) ADF capability developments
will dramatically enhance the potential for Australian maritime forces to
contribute to U.S.-led coalitions in future contingencies. The air warfare de-
stroyers and, especially, the new frigates—with their LACMs, SM-6 missiles,
CEC, possibly theater-ballistic-missile defense, and advanced antisubmarine
warfare systems—would add measurably to any U.S. Navy–led maritime
force.67 The addition of new submarines (with the Collins class already argu-
ably Australia’s most valued maritime capability) would undoubtedly make
Australian contributions to any maritime coalition even more attractive.
Australia’s 2009 defense white paper is a wide-ranging document that reaffirms
certain long-standing elements of Australian defense thinking and also breaks
much new ground. In setting the scene for defense planning over the next twenty
years, the white paper confirms reliance on the U.S. alliance while emphasizing
the need for Australia to deal with most local security challenges without exter-
nal combat assistance.
The white paper affirms that Australia will continue to contribute to U.S.-led
coalitions but asserts that it may have to focus many of its defense efforts closer
to home than has been the case in the recent past. Nevertheless, the white paper
proposes a robust future defense force with a very strong maritime emphasis, in-
cluding a sea-based strike capacity and the ability to deploy, protect, and sustain
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a substantial land force. The increasingly potent and deployable ADF Force 2030
will thus likely be in high demand by future Australian governments, to enhance
Australia’s own regional influence, respond to crises, and when deemed appro-
priate, support the role of its alliance partner in maintaining international
order.
Whether the proposed Force 2030 is affordable remains uncertain, and
whether the government’s assessment is valid that interstate conflict will con-
tinue to be the primary concern of the nation’s military preparations also re-
mains to be determined. Certainly, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific
Century is Canberra’s first concerted attempt in defense policy and strategy
terms to address the security challenges posed by a rising China and regional
great-power dynamics. The Australian government has presented a sober view
of the future and an indication of its determination to prepare for whatever that
future may bring.
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